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INTRODUCTION   
n the relatively short history of nuclear 
weapons, the word at first glance elicits various 
associations such as fear, destruction and 
death. Since their origin in the 1940’s, nuclear 
weapons negotiations have relentlessly dominated 
international relations to create a safer and more 
stable world. The fact of the matter is that the 
world is in a completely different nuclear 
generation than it was when nuclear weapons were 
created. The threat is no longer contained between 
dominant world powers with seemingly endless 
military, economic and technological ability. These 
weapons have proliferated into a new existence, an 
existence that appears to be far less certain, far 
more dangerous and far more difficult to deter. In 
the coming of this age, America has not been idle. 
Years of diplomatic negotiations, generations of 
treaties and billions upon billions of dollars have 
been invested into nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts, and weapons research has continued 
throughout. This paper will evaluate whether these 
efforts are worth it, and most importantly, 
effective in keeping America and inevitably the 
world safe.  
 The primary question this research will 
analyze, is the following: Do American efforts of 
strengthening their nuclear capabilities and 
pursuing non-proliferation truly lead to a safer 
country and world? This is an extremely important 
topic; we are living in the nuclear age so this is 
nothing less than a reality. There are rising 
hostilities in the world, especially between new, 
more radical nuclear threats. Assessing whether or 
not U.S. security efforts are effective is critical. To 
answer this question, this research will primarily 
draw from two similar, but very different views in 
literature regarding nuclear weapons. In The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 
the two authors Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. 
Waltz present their different views on the 
discussion regarding nuclear proliferation. This 
book summarizes and combines independent 
work on the matter by both authors and complies 
it into a complete work. Although the later 
chapters of the book contain dialogue in the form 
of a debate, this research will focus on the first two 
chapters, which simply present each authors 
separate view of the matter. The work in this book 
is similar in the sense that there is mutual 
agreement regarding the ever present issue of the 
reality and presence of nuclear weapons. However, 
the views on how to address and think about this 
issue is where the fundamental differences arise. 
The counter perspectives will enable a contestable 
discussion regarding the issue at hand.  
 This research will apply the ideas from the 
literature to the nuclear history of America. The 
question whether American deterrence efforts and 
investments in nuclear technology are effective or 
not will be addressed from both sides. In addition 
to the primary arguments from Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, this paper will continue to 
introduce literature that aligns with and or falls in 
the middle of the views of the two primary articles. 
The idea of this approach is to add to the 
soundness of the arguments, as well as expand on 
their ideas and even further strengthen the 
different positions. After the literature review is 
complete, it will be time to assess and relate the 
findings to American history surrounding nuclear 
weapons. The main idea here is that, in relating 
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America’s efforts regarding nuclear weapons to the 
literature, a firm consensus can be drawn, that is 
not speculative since it is relying on two opposite 
sides of research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
To begin the literature review, it is important to 
first acquire an understanding of the two sides of 
the matter. As stated before, this research will be 
structured around the different views in the 
enduring debate between Scott D. Sagan and 
Kenneth N. Waltz.  
 Kenneth Waltz is a renowned name in the 
field of political science. His work, and at times, 
controversial views are loved and widely used in 
the field of international relations education. 
Waltz was born in 1924, and served in both World 
War II and the Korean War (Mohn, 1). The 
impact these two wars had on his life gave him 
better insight and awareness to the importance of 
international policy. After the two wars in which 
he served, Waltz became critical of American 
military intervention. This opinion persisted, as 
Waltz became an “early critic of the American 
efforts in Vietnam, and he was equally critical of 
President George W. Bush's actions in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom” (Mohn, 1). His 1981 dissertation, 
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be 
Better outlines his fundamental views on Military 
intervention and deterrence, which the book The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate 
heavily draws from.  
Kenneth Waltz begins his argument by 
essentially stating that despite the United States 
non-proliferation efforts, the spread of nuclear 
weapons is inevitable (Enduring Debate, 3). Waltz 
bases his outlook of policy through the 
international relations theory of realism. He claims 
that in the international realm, the best way states 
can help themselves is by providing for their own 
security (Enduring Debate, 5). A state can prevent 
another state from attacking and preserve their 
own security through one of two ways. The first is 
what Waltz calls the defensive ideal. The idea 
behind this is that states must obtain a defense that 
is so strong, that no other state will attempt an 
attack. The other he calls deterrence theory, which 
he points out, is commonly confused. Deterrence 
is to prevent someone from doing something by 
frightening them. He elaborates by saying, 
“deterrence is achieved not through the ability to 
defend but through the ability to punish” 
(Enduring Debate, 5).    
In the attempt to apply the theory of 
deterrence and defense to the topic of nuclear 
weapons, he points out his primary distinctive 
point. Waltz states, “If nuclear weapons make the 
offense more effective and the blackmailer’s threat 
more compelling, then nuclear weapons are bad 
for the world. On the other hand, if the defense 
and deterrence are made easier and more reliable 
by the spread of nuclear weapons, we may expect 
the opposite result” (Enduring Debate, 6). Waltz’s 
view is essentially that having nuclear weapons is 
only good if it makes deterrence and defense 
better, they are bad if they promote and enable 
offensive tactics.  This goes back to the theory of 
realism.  The level of a state’s power and 
international stability correlates with their ability 
to make themselves secure, which defense – not 
offense – allows for. Waltz then goes on to explain 
how nuclear weapons improve deterrence and 
defense through a series of points.  
He first points out that war can happen even if 
deterrent threats are present. However, if a war 
were to happen between two nuclear states, he 
predicts it will deescalate in the fear of an 
imminent escalation. Further, this fear of 
imminent escalation will prevent states from 
attempting small gains when there is a major risk 
at hand. This is to say, states will take into greater 
consideration the effects of conflict and the 
potentially destructive price of victory. His second 
point expands on his first. He poses the question, 
“Why fight if you can’t win much and lose 
everything?” (Enduring Debate, 7). He is saying 
that a state will act with less care if the expected 
costs of war are low and with greater care if they 
are high.  
He then draws on two examples from history 
to strengthen his point. In the 1850’s France and 
Britain entered into the Crimean War with Russia. 
Victory was expected for France and Britain and 
their actions portrayed their confidence, which in 
war means carelessness. Although the outcome 
was Britain and France’s victory, their known 
prestigious power gave them the idea to show their 
strength first and bargain second. However, in a 
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sharp contrast, the Cold War showed opposite 
considerations. The presence of similar weapons 
put both the United States and the USSR on edge. 
Kennedy and Khrushchev made rational decisions 
with the consideration of their wellbeing, because 
they weighed out the potential devastation of the 
other’s response to their decisions. The third and 
final point Waltz mentions is “Certainty about the 
relative strength of adversaries also makes war less 
likely” (Enduring Debate, 7). This garners a 
completely different meaning in the age of the 
nuclear weapons. In conventional warfare, which 
has been present in the world for the majority of 
history, one is uncertain about winning or losing 
(Waltz, Enduring Debate, 9). However, a nuclear 
world calls for a completely different type of 
reasoning; a nuclear world presents humans with 
an uncertain realization of either annihilation or 
survival.  Waltz remains consistent with the realist 
mindset in shaping his three arguments. The sole 
aim at survival will motivate any leader to consider 
these points when deciding what to do militarily. 
Further, it will deter them from taking nuclear 
action because what will be lost may not be worth 
what is gained. 
To conclude and wrap up on Waltz’s idea of 
“more may be better”, we must assess what these 
points as a whole mean in terms of the reality the 
world faces regarding nuclear weapons. In other 
words, how can one apply what Waltz says about 
nuclear defense and deterrence to what is actually 
going on. In the beginning of his thesis, Waltz 
presents an observation. He notices that “The 
world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 
than had been known in modern history, if peace 
is defined as the absence of general war among the 
major states of the world” (Waltz, “Enduring 
Debate” 4). Waltz argues throughout his thesis 
that nuclear proliferation is the cause of this 
phenomenon. Based off his points listed above, he 
leads to the idea that nuclear weapons pose a 
completely new risk to the world, that even the 
most radical of leaders take into greater 
consideration its implications.  
Waltz believes that this effect of mutual 
deterrence is possible only if the spread of nuclear 
weapons continues, especially to minor world 
powers. Waltz explains that if three criteria are 
met, the size and legitimacy of the state do not 
matter; all that will matter is that they will be able 
to deter. Waltz lists his criteria for being an 
effective deterrent force as,  
 
First, at least a part of a state’s nuclear forces must 
appear to be able to survive an attack and launch 
one of its own. Second, survival of forces must not 
require early firing in response to what may be 
false alarms. Third, command and control must be 
reliably maintained; weapons must not be 
susceptible to accidental or unauthorized use 
(Enduring Debate, 20).   
 
With these criteria met, smaller nuclear powers 
can effectively deter larger nuclear powers because 
they share in the ability to inflict “unacceptable 
damage” (Waltz, “Enduring Debate” 21). 
Essentially, the world will experience much less 
frequent and intense wars, if more nuclear 
weapons are present and further proliferated. The 
common fear of escalation between nuclear 
powers, the carefully considered outcomes, and 
the overall uncertainty of what nuclear war 
beholds, is enough to make war less likely and give 
way to an obtainable peace among international 
states.    
The other side to this debate is presented by 
Scott Sagan. Scott Sagan is a current professor of 
politics at Stanford University. Throughout the 
course of his life, Sagan has acquired numerous 
honors and awards for his work in the field of 
political science. Sagan’s primary academic 
research includes the study of technology and war, 
specifically, nuclear weapons. His section of the 
debate in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An 
Enduring Debate is drawn from his article The 
Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, 
Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons.  
Sagan begins his chapter titled “More Will Be 
Worse,” by acknowledging the expansive literature 
that advocates for nuclear proliferation, such as 
the ideas presented by Waltz. However, Sagan 
notes there is something substantial missing from 
the debate. There is no, “Alternative theory of the 
consequences of nuclear proliferation; an 
alternative that is a broader conception of the 
effects of nuclear weapons proliferation on the 
likelihood of war” (Enduring Debate, 42). Sagan 
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will confront this absent alternative through his 
central argument that he calls “organization 
theory” (Enduring Debate, 42). There are two 
levels to this theory, the first being on the military 
level and the second on the civil level. Sagan argues 
that within professional military organizations, 
there are common biases, inflexible routines, and 
parochial interests, which lead to deterrence 
failures and the possibility of deliberate and or, 
accidental war (Enduring Debate, 42). The second 
level revolves around the civil control of future 
nuclear states. Sagan argues there is strong reason 
to believe these future nuclear states, “will lack the 
positive mechanisms of civilian control” (Enduring 
Debate, 42). Sagan argues this because of the 
common characteristics of current and emerging 
nuclear states. In these states, they appear to have 
either a military-run government or a weak 
civilian-led government. In either of these two 
cases, the military will have a strong presence on 
policy. If the military has a strong influence, then 
the first level of organizational theory, listed above, 
will take place and deterrence failures are likely to 
occur. More specifically, the structural and 
organizational weaknesses of a state can cause 
potentially extreme militant policies, which could 
ruin the principles of deterrence theory.  
To further support his argument, Sagan 
compares his organizational deterrence theory 
with Waltz’s rational deterrence theory. Sagan 
recalls Waltz framework of deterrence and brings 
to the surface the required assumption of this 
entire theory, and that is the assumption of 
rationality. The idea here is that costs are so high, 
which renders sensitivity to military decisions 
inevitable. In addition to noting the assumption of 
rationality, Sagan lists requirements for stable 
nuclear deterrence, which Waltz seems to 
overlook. The first is that states cannot engage in a 
preventive war while one state has nuclear 
weapons and the other is in the process of 
acquiring them. The second is that both states 
must develop assured second-strike capabilities. 
The third is that nuclear arsenals must not be 
prone to accidental or unauthorized use. Sagan 
points this out to show the reality of the situation. 
States will pursue these requirements as goals, 
because it is in their best security interest to do so. 
However, by Sagan comparing his organizational 
perspective, he will prove this as a problematic 
belief.  
Sagan begins to compare his organizational 
theory by first pointing out that rational 
deterrence rests simply upon assumptions. 
Assumptions are nothing but just that, they are 
not empirically tested or always accurate. They are 
used because they are helpful in literature, almost 
as an educated prediction into the future. Sagan 
goes on to state, “The rational – actor view is 
clearly not the only assumption that leads to useful 
predictions about nuclear proliferation” (Enduring 
Debate, 45). One potential, alternative assumption 
could be the possibility that government leaders 
intend to act in a rational order as Waltz’s theory 
proposes, but perhaps that option is not available 
to them and perhaps their final implementation of 
orders are inescapably influenced from forces 
within their country (Enduring Debate, 45). It can 
however be argued that these decisions are still 
rational, just negatively influenced by impractical 
situations. However, there is no denying that there 
is some level of imperfect and incomplete 
rationality present in such conditions. This 
criticism essentially leads to the larger point that 
ideal conditions and perfect knowledge are elusive 
and simply unrealistic. Sagan gives this contrasting 
example to prove that one cannot just rest a case 
on an assumption that nuclear weapons force a 
state to be perfectly rational. It is in this counter 
example of assumptions, that organizational 
theory is able to present its true convincing case 
against the theory of rational deterrence.  
 Sagan advances his argument by explaining 
there are two themes central to organization 
theory, which focus their attention on the major 
impediments on assuming pure rationality of 
behavior. The first is the observation that large 
organizations function with a severely bounded or 
limited, form of rationality (Enduring Debate, 46). 
This is to say they inherently limit their 
calculations and instead use simple mechanisms to 
determine their decisions. Instead of fully 
calculating reasoned decisions, large organizations 
govern based off tendencies, patterns, rules, and 
essentially “satisfice” (Enduring Debate, 46). Large 
organizations tend to be “myopic”, (Enduring 
Debate, 46) which is the same as saying narrow-
minded. When trying to decide on a decision, they 
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fail to survey the entire environment for 
information and instead look to often-biased 
sources.        
The second observation Sagan presents is that 
large, complex organizations commonly have 
multiple conflicting goals, and the process by 
which objectives are chosen and pursued is 
intensely political (Enduring Debate, 46). When a 
decision is largely due to political factors, it is 
inevitable that they serve interests of some of the 
organization. The problems of this is that, the 
favored interests are more often than not a narrow 
interest of the group’s self-interested and 
competitive members in power. Even then, one 
cannot go forth and assume even that group of 
self-interested individuals are rational. One would 
expect this reason to be because it could be led by a 
radical head figure. However, it in fact comes 
down to the idea that conflict stems from 
organizational deficiency, rather than the 
characteristics of each individual. Sagan introduces 
the example of the inner workings of a military 
group. The soldiers have differing opinions than 
the commanders, commanders have differing 
opinions than that of command headquarters and 
so on and so forth. This is to prove, even if a 
professional military service acts in a relatively 
rational way, these actions do not constitute the 
military interests as a whole because of the chances 
of present organizational deficiencies within. 
“Because such narrow organizational interests 
determine behavior, a theory of “rational” state 
action is seriously weakened” (Enduring Debate, 
47).  
In terms of nuclear war, these themes of 
organization entail some obvious potential 
concerns. Sagan presents these fears by relating 
them to the three operational requirements for 
rational deterrence, which he claims Waltz 
overlooked in the beginning of his section. If you 
do not recall, Sagan lists these as –  
1. States cannot engage in a preventive war 
while one state has nuclear weapons and 
the other is in the process of acquiring 
them  
2.  States must develop assured second-strike 
capabilities   
3. Nuclear arsenals must not be prone to 
accidental or unauthorized use.  
The first operational requirement concerns the 
period in which the world is changing from a 
conventional to a nuclear one. The first nuclear 
power must not attack (for preventive purposes) 
any other state that is in the process of acquiring 
nuclear capabilities. To strengthen his argument 
Sagan addresses notions listed by Waltz in his 
book The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May 
Be Better. In this book, Waltz claims there are two 
periods in a nuclear arms race that a state may 
consider preventive strike. “First, a country may be 
in an early stage of nuclear development and be 
obviously unable to make nuclear weapons. 
Second, a country may be in an advanced stage of 
nuclear development and whether or not it has 
some nuclear weapons may not be surely known” 
(Waltz, More May be Better, 16).  
 Waltz further goes on to say that it would 
seem more promising for a country to employ a 
preventive strike in the first stated stage of nuclear 
development, because they would assume that the 
other state could not strike back. However, he 
explains that even this is unlikely and unattractive. 
If the strike is less than debilitating, one must be 
prepared to occupy the country for the reasons of 
monitoring and further preventing a nuclear 
recovery period. This realization alone is enough 
to prevent the strike from being implemented in 
the first place. Sagan then comes back into the 
discussion and undermines Waltz’s idea that a 
state will not preemptively strike simply because it 
is not in their end interest. He points out the flaw 
in arbitrarily assuming “if there is even a remote 
chance of nuclear retaliation, a rational decision 
maker will not launch a preventive war” (Enduring 
Debate, 49). Sagan’s organizational perspective is 
far more pessimistic about this assumption 
because it considers military intervention, which 
Waltz dismisses because according to him, 
everyone will have the same level of rationality in 
considering nuclear war. Although there is some 
truth in this, the main point of organizational 
theory is that one cannot assume this truth to 
stand in all circumstances. Military leaders are 
more predisposed to view preventive war with 
more favor because in short, they do not have to 
worry about the broader political and diplomatic 
issues involved in war. Military leaders are not 
voted officials with political agendas to fill. 
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Militaries are trained to focus on military goals 
with victory at all costs mantras. They are war 
ready soldiers not members of the Peace Corps. In 
only considering the present, there is the crucial 
long-term considerations absent. Further, since 
civilians cannot accurately be assumed to be in 
control of all future nuclear states, there is solid 
ground to conclude that military biases in favor of 
war will be at least – present enough to harm the 
common rationality assumption that deterrence 
theory requires.   
 The second operational requirement of 
deterrence is the state’s capacity to withstand a 
preventive nuclear strike, and still be able to 
employ second-strike capabilities. This is to say, 
every country that possesses nuclear weapons 
must develop their forces to be invulnerable. Waltz 
says this is possible for two reasons. The first is 
summarized as “Not much is required to deter” 
(Waltz, More May be Better, 19). What this means 
in considering second – strike capabilities is, even 
if a country is attacked, that same country will be 
able to reciprocate enough destructive damage 
with even one warhead. This builds on the next 
reason that states, “Deterrent forces are seldom 
delicate because no states wants delicate forces and 
nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy” (Waltz, 
More May be Better, 18). Therefore, in the event of 
an attack, Waltz assumes that a state’s nuclear 
forces will be well guarded and strategically placed 
to prevent total loss of their second-strike 
capability. To reiterate, Waltz concludes that states 
will be aware of their nuclear capabilities, and will 
rationally adjust their tactics to defend by 
maintaining an offensive position if need be.  
 Sagan responds to this by questioning its 
accuracy when applied to every given nuclear 
situation. If only a few nuclear weapons 
strategically placed is all that will suffice to deter, 
then it is puzzling that arms races are seemingly 
inevitable when it comes to nuclear weapons. 
Waltz accredits this to “fuzzy thinking” on the 
state level. Fuzzy thinking is more or less a 
scapegoat created by Waltz to explain the apparent 
arms races despite his point of not much being 
needed to deter. However, Sagan replies by 
introducing his organizational theory into the 
matter and says “If fuzzy thinking at the domestic 
level can cause a state to spend billions of dollars 
building more forces than are necessary for 
rational deterrence, couldn’t similar fuzzy thinking 
at the organizational level also lead a state to build 
inadequate forces?” (Enduring Debate, 58). As 
stated previously, under an organizational theory, 
militaries do not take nearly as much 
consideration in their planning, which render 
them irrational in some regards. Consequently, 
even if Waltz’s parts are there, that is the proper 
resources and conditions for second-strike 
capabilities, a state may still not effectively reach 
these capabilities if organizational biases dominate 
the states behavior. In reality, it all comes down to 
who is making the decisions. In Waltz’s model 
there is no mention of militaries and in Sagan’s 
model, the decision-making is generally controlled 
by the imperfect militaries. In either case, Sagan is 
not convinced that deterrence is always achievable.  
 The final operational requirement is that 
nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental or 
unauthorized use. Waltz looks to the history of 
nuclear armament in the world and draws his 
reasoning from that. Essentially, he arrives at the 
fact that all countries have so far been able to 
control their arms, despite tensions being so bitter 
in their early history. He then raises the question 
“why should we expect new nuclear states to 
experience greater difficulties than the old ones 
were able to cope with?” (More May be Better, 18). 
Waltz rests this assumption on his theory of 
rationality as stated, “we do not have to wonder 
whether they will take good care of their weapons. 
They have every incentive to do so. They will not 
want to risk retaliation because one or more of 
their warheads accidently strikes another country” 
(More May be Better, 18). He reasons that it is 
presumably in the best interest of a state to keep 
their arms under strict control, in order to 
preserve their own security. Take for example an 
instance where a developing nuclear country loses 
one of their nuclear weapons to a radical terrorist 
organization within that country. If the stolen 
weapon was launched from within the parameters 
of that country, whatever country was hit will 
retaliate on the state as a whole without looking to 
see why the attack was employed in the first place. 
Clearly no country wishes to receive a retaliation 
strike, so why would they risk the susceptibility of 
their nuclear weapons.  
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 In analyzing Sagan, Waltz’s reasoning behind 
the likelihood of improper nuclear use seems to be 
exactly what he was waiting for to complete his 
organizational theory, more or less the piece that 
solidifies his argument. What does organizational 
theory say exactly about the likelihood of nuclear 
weapon accidents? Well, the entire theory is 
grounded on the possibility that instances like this 
can occur in our non-perfect world, and that 
rationality cannot so easily be assumed. If, as 
Waltz states, organizations are rational, then they 
may be able to achieve reliability in managing their 
devastating technologies such as nuclear weapons. 
However, if situations create an organization that 
has limited rationality with present political 
conflicts, then a pessimistic view to the operational 
requirement would be much more appropriate. 
Sagan takes it further than simply denying total 
rationality. He introduces what is known as the 
Normal Accidents theory by Charles Perrow. This 
theory argues that there are limits to the degree of 
which any organization can understand its 
technological systems. In addition, “conflicting 
objectives exist inside any organization: some top 
– level authorities may place a high priority on 
safety, while other on more self-interested 
objectives” (Sagan, “Enduring Debate”, 68). This 
ultimately leads to organizational failures through 
risky behaviors, making it inevitable that system 
accidents will occur. It is just a matter of time.  
 In conclusion, Sagan recognizes Waltz’s views 
of stable deterrence based on rational assumptions 
as valid, but he delves deeper into reality and says 
rationality cannot always be assumed. Since 
rationality cannot be assumed, it would be foolish 
and potentially harmful to base policy off this 
model, since the consequences could be so grave. 
Organization theory by its nature “makes less 
heroic assumptions about the rationality of states” 
(Sagan, “Enduring Debate” 76). The epitome of 
this theory is to err on the side of caution, keeping 
in mind that there must be doubt in some 
organizations to make the rational decision.  This 
goes beyond just saying Waltz’s theory is bad it 
shows how it is susceptible to questioning because 
of inevitable internal forces some organizations 
will face. The primary takeaway of Sagan’s section 
is stated perfectly by himself in the conclusion of 
his chapter. He states, “Waltz has confused 
prescriptions of what rational states should do, 
with predictions of what real states will do” 
(Enduring Debate” 78).  
At this stage in the paper, the primary 
frameworks for both sides have been presented 
and analyzed. From here, it is time to introduce 
other significant views from the field of nuclear 
weapons study that fall within the division laid out 
by Sagan and Waltz. The reason is that it will allow 
sturdier ground for the American case analyzation 
that will ensue. To keep the non-proliferation 
momentum rolling, I will introduce first the 
literature that in nature, aligns with Sagan and the 
larger non-proliferation (less is more) idea. The 
two pieces of literature chosen to support this view 
are, the book About Glory and Terror: The 
Growing Nuclear Danger by Steven Weinberg and 
an academic article named The Myth of Nuclear 
Deterrence by Ward Wilson. The two pieces of 
literature are similar yet different. Each of the two 
present different ways of supporting and 
approaching their overall common consensus, 
which is that nuclear deterrence and investments 
in nuclear weaponry are not only ineffective, but 
also harmful to a secure world.   
Steven Weinberg, the author of About Glory 
and Terror: The Growing Nuclear Danger is a 
notable American Physicist, who was born in 
1933. In the early years of his life, Weinberg was 
not only deeply immersed in his love for science; 
but he was also growing up in a heavily nuclear 
influenced generation. Weinberg pursued his 
passion for science and eventually attended 
Princeton University, where he obtained his 
doctoral degree in Physics. Weinberg went on to 
achieve enormous prestige in the field of nuclear 
physics when he unified the electromagnetic and 
weak nuclear forces into the electroweak force 
(Benson, 16). This complex theoretical 
breakthrough led to him winning the Nobel Prize, 
which further progressed his influence in the field. 
Weinberg authored About Glory and Terror: The 
Growing Nuclear Danger in 2004, as a political 
theory that analyzes the effectiveness of attempts 
to expand and modernize America’s already 
massive nuclear arsenal.  
The opening sentence in About Glory and 
Terror: The Growing Nuclear Danger exposes an 
important truth, “The United States possesses an 
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enormous nuclear arsenal, left over from the days 
of the Cold War” (Weinberg, 3). The reality of this 
fact sheds light onto an important question, why 
are all of these nuclear weapons still needed? 
During the Cold War, the rational argument for 
the large arsenal was motivated by deterrence 
sentiments, much like the one presented by Waltz. 
The idea was that “we had to be sure that the 
soviets would be deterred from a surprise attack 
on the United States by their certainty that enough 
of our arsenal would survive any such attack to 
allow us to deliver devastating response” 
(Weinberg, 4). Now however, this “glorified” 
arsenal is obsolete. It may seem as if the ability to 
launch a preemptive strike against foreign nuclear 
forces is in our benefit, but it is actually 
enormously dangerous for all sides. If this is the 
goal of both nuclear sides, their forces will be on 
trigger alert. This tension presents the possibility 
of a nuclear attack due to small miscalculations, 
which will end in senseless devastation on both 
sides. In short, the rational deterrence mindset is 
not leading mankind into the peaceful waters away 
from the terrifying Cold War era. Instead, it is 
holding onto as much of that legacy as possible 
(Weinberg, 6).  
Much of the reason why countries try to 
maintain their nuclear arsenals is because of the 
fear of uncertainty. Weinberg addresses this in 
asking, “Where is it written that the way to reduce 
uncertainty is always to maximize our nuclear 
capabilities?” (Weinberg, 25). It is crucial to keep 
in mind the fact that what one nuclear power does, 
another may imitate to keep the battlefield 
“certain” so to say. Weinberg insists, “Dangers 
may be increased rather than decreased” through 
this strategy (Weinberg, 26). He relates this 
finding to a military example, which took place in 
Europe during the early 1900’s. In the early 
twentieth century, Britain was the undisputed 
greatest naval power of the world. In 1905, to 
further this era of power, Admiral John Fisher 
advocated for the construction of a new, deadlier 
battleship. The design was completed, and was 
given the name the Dreadnought. Dreadnoughts 
fulfilled their goal and were superior to previous 
naval ships; however, an unexpected result 
occurred. Other countries saw this as an 
opportunity to better their navy as well and soon 
enough, they were able to construct their own 
Dreadnoughts and thus, compete with Britain. 
Suddenly, the size of a countries fleet no longer 
mattered, just the number of Dreadnoughts a 
country possessed (Weinberg, 27).  
What was intended as a way to better Britain’s 
navy, resulted in a naval arms race between Britain 
and the other global superpower, Germany. 
Britain was able to stay ahead, but forfeited great 
expense and experienced many difficulties in the 
process. Another admiral of the British navy 
complained to parliament, “The whole British fleet 
was morally scrapped and labeled obsolete at the 
moment when it was at the zenith of its efficiency 
and equal not to two but practically all the other 
navies of the world combined” (Weinberg, 27). 
This example is extremely relatable to the current 
situation countries face regarding nuclear 
weapons. Much like the case of Britain with the 
creation of the Dreadnought, America is the now 
the world’s leader in warfare and the creator of the 
nuclear bomb. Comparatively, just like 
Dreadnoughts, nuclear weapons are seen as a tool 
for power, which are sought after to act as 
equalizers. If anything has been deduced so far 
from Weinberg, it is that such equalizers only 
create more tension and are not serving national 
security.  
Weinberg concludes in recognizing that the 
technology of nuclear weapons is extraordinary. 
However, the piece currently missing is the 
examination of which tasks they are effective in, 
and which of these tasks needs to be pursued and 
accomplished (Weinberg, 58). Without getting too 
technical regarding the terms of nuclear 
capabilities, Weinberg recognizes as an example 
the “low-yield nuclear weapon” projects that are 
being heavily funded. The error in these projects is 
not necessarily the money being poured in; the 
problem is, rather, that “it will encourage a new 
round of nuclear weapons development 
throughout the world” (Weinberg, 60). Similarly, 
projects aimed toward missile defense is bound to 
face the same negative results. One would think, a 
system used to intentionally collide with an 
enemies’ warhead is beneficial for the (oh shit) 
moments. In reality, it poses the threat of keeping 
tensions of the Cold War frozen in time because it 
shows that we are actively preparing for 
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something, anything. The main point and really 
the principle that ties Weinberg’s analysis together 
is that, seemingly harmless defensive strategies can 
easily be mistaken for offensive strategies. 
Therefore, there needs to be much more concern 
in planning what is truly effective, after 
considering how other countries will view and 
respond to such actions.     
The final piece of literature presented to 
support the non-proliferation opinion comes from 
Ward Wilson’s The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence. 
According to his biography on the Federation of 
American Scientists website, Wilson is “widely 
acknowledged as the leading exponent of 
pragmatic arguments against nuclear weapons in 
the world today” (FAS.org). Wilson is an award 
winning writer whose ideas and literature 
challenges widely held fundamental assumptions 
about nuclear weapons, primarily the theories 
regarding rationality.  
Wilson takes a rather interesting approach to 
refute the held theory that nuclear weapons are 
tools of deterrence. He notes that the common 
ground proliferation proponents rest on is that the 
belief of mutually assured destruction provides 
unique stability in a crisis, which leads to 
deterrence. However, Wilson believes there is 
much to doubt in this theory, which he will prove 
through his historical case analysis. Before he 
delves into relating history with the current 
nuclear state, Wilson lays out three practical 
arguments against nuclear deterrence theories. 
The first is that “city attacks” are not militarily 
effective or likely to be decisive. The second is that 
the psychology of terror that is supposed to work 
in nuclear deterrence’s favor actually creates the 
circumstances for unremitting resistance. The 
third and final argument is, even though the field 
is mostly conjectural, what little unambiguous 
evidence does exist contradicts the claim that 
nuclear deterrence works. (Wilson, 421). Each of 
these arguments will be revisited and related to the 
historical case studies Wilson decides to analyze. 
Wilson first addresses the widely held core of 
nuclear deterrence theory, which is the idea that 
possible city bombings or any domestic attack will 
deter nuclear powers from entering into conflict.  
Deterrence theory holds that the idea of the loss of 
land, life and inevitably the state will motivate 
leaders to avoid any measure that could risk such 
attacks. In other words, “there is the assumption 
that leaders are influenced in decisions about war 
and surrender by the deaths of noncombatants in 
city based attacks” (Wilson, 423). The problem 
with this notion and similarly with the other two 
arguments is that there is insufficient historical 
evidence to support these claims. Wilson then 
looks to a relevant case from the Second World 
War, when the impact of conventional aerial 
bombings were being discussed. The conventional 
bombs in this era were seen as horrifying tools, 
capable of inflicting significant damage, similar to 
how nuclear bombs are seen today. Italian general 
Giulio Douhet understood the possible effects of 
an air raid and stated, “A complete breakdown of 
the social structure cannot but take place in a 
country subjected to this kind of merciless 
pounding.  
The time would soon come, when to put an 
end to the horror and suffering, the people would 
rise and demand an end to war” (Wilson, 424). 
However, history proved this and many other 
similar predictions to be wrong. In the course of 
World War II, England was subjected to serious 
city bombings in London. Nevertheless, the 
English never surrendered. In fact, it has been 
noted that Churchill essentially forfeited London 
as a diversion, which caused them to stay shy away 
from Britain’s important military assets (Wilson, 
425). In a separate but equivalent case, the 
Germans also suffered air raids, even worse so 
than did their neighbor England did. However, 
German civilian morale remained strong as the 
Nazi party prospered, and the economy actually 
rose (Wilson, 425).  
The difficult case of city bombing to work with 
is inevitably Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Wilson 
posits the possible reason this case is hard to 
analyze, is because “people are unable to resist 
confusing arguments about whether nuclear 
weapons were effective with arguments about 
whether their use was morally justified” (Waltz, 
426). Wilson himself admits this is a difficult case 
to analyze because there really has never been 
anything quite like it. However, in recent 
scholarship, there have been reasons presented 
that serve as arguments against the belief that 
bombs were the reason for Japanese surrender. 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018 
57 
 
Some of these arguments include, the Soviet 
invasion on August 5 altered Japan’s strategic 
situation and was more of the reason for surrender 
than the bombs were. This is supported by another 
argument, which essentially purports that the 
bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were just a 
continuation of city bombings that were generally 
equal to the culmination of the destruction of the 
conventional attacks (Wilson, 426). If they did not 
surrender before when their country was being 
annihilated by conventional bombs, why would 
they surrender after the nuclear bombs were 
dropped if the damage was similar? This leads 
back to the possibility that the Soviet Invasion was 
the true reason for surrender, not the nuclear 
bombs.  
The second argument against deterrence 
regards the psychology of terror. Wilson 
approaches terrorism by comparing its central 
mechanisms to the core nature of deterrence. 
Ultimately, Wilson concludes that terrorism is 
ineffective at working in deterrence’s favor and in 
doing so, he further concludes that deterrence, as a 
concept is ineffective. Wilson states that, 
“terrorism is supposed to work by killing civilians 
in order to shock and horrify governments into 
complying with a terrorist’s demands” (Wilson, 
430). In a less extreme level, deterrence essentially 
aims at the same thing. Earlier in this paper, Waltz 
defines deterrence as preventing someone from 
doing something by frightening them. The 
ineffective part of both terrorism and deterrence is 
in the common factor of achieving ones policy 
through the implementation of fear or threats. In 
past events, efforts of terrorism have not ended 
with the country being attacked simply 
succumbing out of fear. For example, look to the 
tragic events of 9/11. People were indeed 
frightened, but more than anything furious and 
ready to retaliate on the aggressors.  
The primary reason behind this is that, no 
matter the magnitude of the attack, the livelihood 
of the entire country is threatened. Wilson 
explains this phenomenon in saying, “If you attack 
civilians, in other words, no matter what sort of 
message you intend to communicate, you already 
are likely to simply convince your opponent that 
you intend to exterminate him and the country as 
a whole” (Wilson, 431). This concept can mutually 
be applied to the deterrence model because any 
perceived act of threat or aggression will have 
adverse consequences for the side who posed the 
threat in the first place. When the primary strategy 
of achieving ones policy is through fear, it will 
more likely than not end in conflict because of the 
active and heightened defense that is forced upon 
the threatened state. In other words, if two states 
are in a conflict and both of their strategies are 
deterrence, both countries will ideally be ready to 
attack at a moment’s notice because they are each 
assuming the other has the same mindset. This is 
why the Cuban missile crisis was so frightening. 
Any perceived act of aggression between the 
United States and the Soviet Union could have 
released thousands of nuclear weapons ending 
millions of lives indefinitely. Terrorist threats 
essentially act in the same way. The more threats 
and violence a terrorist organization inflicts, the 
more likely a state will be inclined to retaliate at all 
costs.  
The last argument presented by Wilson is that 
the evidence that does exist for the pro deterrence 
model is contradictive and seemingly ignorant of 
history. The first example that Wilson looks to is 
the arbitrary assumption that deterrence prevented 
nuclear attacks during the frigid Cold War years of 
1950 – 1980. The fact of the matter is there are 
countless other explanations for such absence of 
nuclear attacks.  Comparatively, the hundred years 
following the Napoleonic wars were for the most 
part peaceful, but we have no problem attributing 
these to, “war weariness, economic exhaustion, or 
domestic political distraction” (Wilson, 433). Is it 
too implausible to assume that the United States 
and the USSR were equally “war tired”? In essence, 
how can we accurately conclude that deterrence 
prevented war without clear evidence that war was 
even imminent between the two countries 
(Wilson, 433)? 
Ultimately, Wilson is arguing the things that 
are so popularly attributed to deterrence lose most 
of their ground when you introduce reality and 
historically similar events into the equation. Much 
of what deterrence and the larger pro-proliferation 
argument relies on is that states will be rational 
because they will do whatever it takes to preserve 
their infrastructure and cities. After analyzing 
history, this central assumption is seriously 
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weakened because of the many examples of cities 
being close to annihilated, yet remained 
undefeated. Equally, in the terrorism/deterrence 
comparison, there is the consensus that these 
practices are effective ways of achieving policy 
goals. However, after history is introduced, this 
theory too loses validation. Lastly, commonly held 
assumptions that deterrence is the reason for the 
peace in the Cold War are contradicted with a 
similar scenario of peace following other major 
conflicts, but for different reasons that the blindly 
assumed deterrence theory.  
Thus far, there has been a sufficient amount of 
literature that supports the less is more view of 
Sagan. It is now time to move on to the other side 
of the enduring debate, and present some of the 
literature that supports Waltz’s more is better 
view. The two authors chosen to advocate for this 
view are Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. 
Riker, who jointly contribute to the academic 
thesis An Assessment of the Merits of Selective 
Nuclear Proliferation. Both de Mesquita and Riker 
are well known political scientists, with a special 
influence on the scientist part. The primary 
grounds they base their political theories on is 
calculative equations such as game theory. In 
analyzing their work however, I will stay clear of 
the complex mathematical equations but explain 
the takeaways of each of their findings in simple 
form.  
The title alone, An Assessment of the Merits of 
Selective Nuclear Proliferation, explicitly tells us 
something about the conclusion of this literature. 
The selective aspect means there will be some 
weighing out of both sides in their findings, which 
seems typical of mathematically motivated minds. 
Nevertheless, this research advocates for nuclear 
proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons 
throughout the world. Riker and de Mesquita 
begin their argument through presenting the 
observation that the United States has relied on 
two policies to defend themselves since the onset 
of nuclear reality. These include, “The 
maintenance of a stock of weapons and delivery 
systems that at least allows for retaliation against 
any potential nuclear attack and the 
discouragement of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons among countries hitherto not so armed” 
(de Mesquita, Riker, 283). Together, these defense 
policies constitute deterrence. The rationale for 
this policy is the same as had been discussed 
previously; no one will attempt to attack the 
United States even if they themselves had 
weapons, because they risk the fear of retaliation.  
If we were to judge its effectiveness simply by 
looking at nuclear conflicts since these policies 
were implemented, the policy would obviously be 
said to work, since that number is zero. However, 
the two scientists do not rest their case there. They 
want to base their preferred policy of deterrence 
on something more substantial, “But to the degree 
that the policy has not been critically analyzed and 
its consequences clearly understood, we do not 
know what the putative success has cost and 
whether it is due to good planning or good luck” 
(de Mesquita, Riker, 284). The two scientists go 
about strengthening the grounds of deterrence by 
presenting a model of conflict decision making. 
Today, conflict situations render down to four 
scenarios, they are, 
 
“(A) The initiator and the initiators opponent both 
have nuclear capability sufficient to impose 
unacceptable damage on the other. (B) The 
initiator has a nuclear capability as described in 
(A), but the opponent has only conventional (or 
modest nuclear) capabilities insufficient to impose 
unacceptable damage. (C) The initiator has only a 
conventional capability and the opponent has a 
nuclear retaliatory capability as in (A). (D) Both 
the initiator and the opponent have only a 
conventional (or modest nuclear) capability 
insufficient to impose unacceptable damage.” (de 
Mesquita, Riker 293).  
 
From this list of strategies, the authors construct a 
prisoner’s dilemma game board titled, “To 
Proliferate or Not”   
  Nonnuclear  Nuclear 
Nonnuclear  D,D C,B 
Nuclear  B,C A,A 
 
As we can see from this figure, when the 
nuclear capabilities of the adversaries are 
symmetrical, then “neither is clearly able to 
impose its will upon the other, nor does either 
have any incentive to use its nuclear capability in a 
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war against the other” (de Mesquita, Riker, 300). It 
is now that we can rely on historical evidence to 
back up this equation. As shown above, when 
there is a conflict between a nuclear power and a 
non-nuclear power, one could assume that the 
outcome would be nuclear, just as in the conflict 
between Japan and the United States. However, 
when two nations that are nuclear powers enter in 
a conflict, the assumption is that the losses will be 
so devastating, that the conflict will deescalate and 
avoid nuclear war at all costs. This can most 
infamously be related to the Cold War.  
 The reality the world faces today is that nukes 
are out there, and have already proliferated 
whether we like it or not. However, de Mesquita 
and Riker are not advocating that countries with 
nukes dump their nuclear repertoire into any 
country that does not possess them. Instead, they 
take a practical approach for advocating 
proliferation. The authors recognize the reality of 
what they refer to as “non-territorial terrorist 
organizations” (de Mesquita, Riker, 304). The 
existence of these groups harm their game theory 
analysis because these organizations essentially 
have nothing to lose. Therefore, deterrence will 
not be as effective on them and likewise, they will 
not consider their destruction since they offer no 
obvious retaliation targets. Due to this, the authors 
advocate to weigh out the possibilities to the point 
where proliferation is expected to decrease 
violence more so than proliferation would increase 
violence at the hands of the terrorists. In 
conclusion, blind proliferation may not be the 
answer that best serves national security. However, 
the authors are saying their analysis is concise and 
that when done properly, proliferation will act as a 
deterrent against nuclear war.  
 
ANALYSIS  
Based off the literature review, one can infer that 
the landscape of opinions regarding nuclear policy 
is vast. The literature that has been presented in 
this paper displays division in support for either 
the non-proliferation or pro-proliferation theory. 
However, what is clear in both arguments is that 
we are living in a nuclear reality. Metaphorically, 
the genie has been permanently let out of the 
bottle and what has been done cannot be reversed. 
Nevertheless, the question at hand is how America 
is supposed to deal with this almost science 
fictional reality of a potential Armageddon. More 
importantly, are the efforts already taken 
effectively serving our, and inevitably, the world’s 
best security interest? Yet, before this research can 
move on to an argument for or against the 
effectiveness of American nuclear efforts, the 
crucial element regarding the history of American 
nuclear weapons and treaties must first be added 
into consideration. By briefly relating the major 
historical elements with the differing theories from 
the literature, we can determine its effectiveness, 
and ultimately arrive at a conclusion.  
 America’s nuclear history is unique; the reason 
for this is rather obvious. To this day, America is 
the only country to have used a nuclear bomb in 
warfare with the attack on Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima in August of 1945. However, it would 
be inaccurate to say that this initiated the nuclear 
age. Rather, the nuclear age commenced on a cold 
December morning in 1942, when Arthur 
Compton received a ground breaking cryptic, 
coded statement reading “The Italian navigator 
has just landed in the new world” (Clarfield, 
Wiecek, 1). Arthur Compton was a Nobel laureate 
and director of the University of Chicago’s 
Metallurgical Laboratory, and the “Italian 
navigator” was an Italian scientist named Enrico 
Fermi who had just successfully demonstrated 
controlled atomic fission (Clarfield, Wiecek, 1). 
This was more than a scientific breakthrough; it 
was a crucial piece to a puzzle in the feverish secret 
race to produce nuclear weapons.  
 This feverish race originated a few years earlier 
with the United States realization of the imminent 
Nazi war machine. In 1939, “Albert Einstein and 
Leo Szilard warned of developments in Nazi 
Germany and urged President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to begin a research program on nuclear 
fission for military use” (Sidel, Levy, 1). Roosevelt 
took heed to this suggestion and created the 
Manhattan Project in 1941 to develop, produce 
and test the bombs. The Manhattan project was a 
highly classified mission lead by nuclear physicist 
Robert Oppenheimer. Despite its name, the work 
of the project was distributed to various locations 
all over the country, which employed some of the 
brightest scientific minds like that of Compton 
and Fermi. Just a year after Roosevelt started the 
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project, the Italian navigator successfully reached 
atomic fission. A few short years later, on the 
morning of July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New 
Mexico, the world’s first nuclear weapon 
detonation test called the Trinity Explosion was 
completed (Schenck, Youmans, 400). This was it, it 
validated the design and functionality of the bomb 
and it is exactly what the Manhattan Project was 
intended to do. The bomb was eventually put to 
use, and was detonated over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The combined causality rate staggered 
near 150,000 people and the true power of the 
bomb was revealed to the world. The primary 
question at hand moved from, how the bomb is 
going to be completed, to – what next?  
 America and the international community 
sought to answer this question in 1946 when “they 
began negotiations under the auspices of the 
United Nations, on the international control of 
atomic energy” (Perry, 36). The proposal was a 
U.S. sponsored plan known as the Baruch Plan. 
The primary goal of this plan was that all nuclear 
activities be controlled by an international entity 
under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council. 
Any state that broke such agreements would be 
duly punished. In addition, the Soviet Union 
would have to agree to inspection before the 
United States even thought about giving up their 
nuclear weapons (Perry, 36-37). It was no surprise 
that the stringent agreements of this proposal were 
ill received by the Soviet Union, “Stalin’s young 
delegate to the UN Atomic Energy Commission 
rejected the U.S. plan” (Clarfield, Wiecek, 1). The 
reason for this rejection was speculated that the 
Soviet Union was determined to match the United 
States by developing their own bomb (Perry, 36-
37). This of course was proven accurate in 1949 
when the Soviet Union successfully detonated 
their first nuclear weapon.  
 The Soviet Union’s success in detonating a 
nuclear bomb caused the once singular nuclear 
power America, to become uneasy. The fact of the 
matter was that America just lost their nuclear 
monopoly. Despite the obvious differences 
between testing and successfully employing a 
nuclear weapon, the United States and then 
president, Harry Truman recognized the need to 
act. Truman’s response to this was to develop a 
more advanced and therefore, deadlier nuclear 
weapon known as the hydrogen bomb. The 
primary rationale behind this decision was fully 
based on the Soviets past nuclear success, so if 
Truman did not pursue it, then the Soviets would 
beat them to it (Charnysh, 2). However, “the 
Russians followed in this pursuit” (Rotblat et al, 
22), which launched the nuclear arms race into 
immediate effect (pun – intended).  
In the 1950’s, Truman’s successor, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower attempted at a more passive and 
diplomatic approach. He announced his idea to 
the United Nations under the umbrella term, the 
Atoms for Peace program. After a frightening 
speculation of the destructive power of the world’s 
nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower suggested that, “this 
greatest of destructive forces can be developed into 
a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind” 
(Clarfield, Wiecek, 184). Eisenhower proposed 
that the major nuclear powers (United States, 
Soviet Union and Great Britain) “contribute 
uranium and other fissionable materials to a 
stockpile administered by a proposed 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” 
(Clarfield, Wiecek, 184). From here, the IAEA will 
distribute this material to promote peaceful 
purposes. The program achieved this for “twenty-
six developing and friendly nations. In return, the 
recipient nations fulfilled U.S.-required 
safeguards, such as having inspectors continually 
monitor the transferred technology to ensure its 
peaceful use” (Schenck, Youmans, 405).  
Despite all the beneficial purposes Atoms for 
Peace produced, these negotiations did not result 
in any formal international arms control 
agreements. The Cold War only got colder and 
nuclear weapons tests only got larger and more 
frequent. In October of 1962, U.S. President 
Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev found 
themselves face to face in the Cuban missile crisis, 
which has been referred to as the most dangerous 
crisis of the Cold War. (Perry, 41). The intensity 
and frequency of such events caused public anxiety 
to grow, which compelled governments to seek 
“partial measures to alleviate immediate worries” 
(Rotblat et al, 24). The treaties that originated 
from these alleviation efforts still had the end goal 
of complete nuclear disarmament, however, they 
shifted their goals from the generalized 
commitment to disarmament, to the more focused 
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approach of deterrence (preventing the use of 
nuclear weapons) (Schenck, Youmans, 406). 
Essentially, the major nuclear powers realized 
disarmament was practically impossible if that is 
your primary goal. The hope was that by shifting 
goals to deterrence, maybe someday disarmament 
might be reachable. The treaties that contain the 
shift in policy include, the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
of 1963, which limited nuclear testing by 
prohibiting the testing in the atmosphere, outer 
space and underwater. The Tlatelolco Treaty of 
1967, which essentially established disarmament in 
at least part of the world by creating nuclear free 
zones. Latin American countries played the largest 
role in this treaty, as they signed away their rights 
of ever acquiring nuclear weapons. However, the 
main treaty that came from this is the Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (Rotblat, 24-25).  
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the 
principal treaty because it “represented the first 
major effort by the international community of 
nations to limit the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction” (Schenck, Youmans, 408). The 
core of the NPT prohibits member nations that do 
not have nuclear weapons from acquiring them. In 
addition, the NPT allows inspections by the IAEA 
to ensure that nuclear enriched elements such as 
plutonium and uranium are being used for nuclear 
energy and not nuclear weapons. Essentially this 
part of the treaty strengthens the Atoms for Peace 
doctrine of the Eisenhower era (Rotblat, 24-25). 
For the states that possessed nuclear weapons, 
“they agreed not to transfer these weapons to non-
nuclear states, while at the same time working 
towards the goal of eventual nuclear disarmament” 
(Schenck, Youmans, 408). Despite all of these U.S. 
sponsored demands, there are no provisions that 
prohibit deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. 
There was obvious Soviet discontent, but the final 
draft did not prohibit the United States from 
deploying weapons in allied countries (Perry, 77).  
In the sixty years following the NPT of 1968, 
the United States began to hone in on their goals 
regarding nuclear policy. Instead of advocating for 
non-proliferation at large, the United States 
focused their attention on their dominant threats. 
Until the end of the Cold War in the 1980’s, the 
obvious threat that dominated their policy 
decisions was the Soviet Union. The arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
produced nuclear arsenals ranging in the tens of 
thousands second-strike capable nukes. It was a 
seemingly endless construction. The ever-
expanding repertories of both sides compelled 
them to keep trying to beat out their opponent by 
out-building them. The acronym MAD, which 
stands for mutually assured destruction, was 
accredited to the extremely dangerous situation 
that the arms race created. In order to prevent this 
potential assured destruction; in 1968, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson suggested a series of talks with 
the Soviet Union called the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT). These talks began in 
1970 between his successor Richard Nixon and 
Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The 
first of these talks known as SALT I resulted in two 
rather important agreements, “The Interim 
Agreement on Offensive Arms, which limited the 
offensive strategic weaponry such as submarines. 
And the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), 
which limited ICBM defense missiles” (Schenck, 
Youmans, 416).  
In the next seven years, discussions aimed at 
improving the SALT I treaties opened up the doors 
for SALT II. However, these did not come as easily 
as SALT I. Overall, these discussions took seven 
years and fell into Jimmy Carters term. The two 
countries came to the agreement that since the 
SALT I agreements, their weapon designs shifted, 
thus rendering future agreements difficult because 
of their incompatible technologies. For better or 
worse, anything that was agreed on was suspended 
because of the 1980 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. After this conflict ended the two 
countries resumed discussions, this time called the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). These 
discussions were infamously between U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan laid out the primary 
goal, which was designed “to limit the actual 
weapons, the warheads, ‘which are what kill 
people,’ as distinguished from the approach of the 
Nixon, Ford, Carter administrations, which only 
limited the delivery vehicle and bombers” 
(Schenck, Youmans, 425).  
At first, these were not well received by 
President Gorbachev but eventually the two met. 
They concluded that nuclear war must never be 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018 
62 
 
fought and their nuclear arms must be reduced. By 
the end of the meetings the United States and the 
Soviet Union agreed on reducing “strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles to 1,600 and cap deployed nuclear 
warheads at 6,000” (Schenck, Youmans, 426). In 
addition, “the two reached the so called “double-
zero” option, which called for the complete 
elimination of all intermediate-range and shorter-
range nuclear forces (INF)” (Schenck, Youmans, 
427). This was an immense treaty because in 
addition to eliminating INF missiles, it also 
implemented on-site inspections, which broke 
enormous barriers between the long tensed United 
States and the Soviet Union.  
START agreements are still currently active 
and in the nuclear policy between the United 
States and Russia, because the size of both nuclear 
stockpiles are still nothing to disregard. However, 
American- Russian nuclear conflict is no longer at 
the top priority for America. At the end of the 
1980’s and into the early 1990’s the long standing 
Soviet Union took its lasts breaths and eventually 
dissolved into the Russian Federation. The United 
States nuclear policy shifted into more or less the 
primary focus of the current policy. Now, the 
United States main threats involve those 
commonly called radical and rogue nations, who 
are constantly working towards getting nuclear 
weapons. This focus especially heightened in the 
years following September 11, 2001, because this 
threat simply became too legitimate to possibly 
ignore.  
The new policy is widely referred to as 
“preemption,” which calls for America to act 
against these dangerous acquisitions of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction before they fully form (Perry, 
300). Deterrence would not necessarily work 
under this situation because “deterrence is based 
only on the threat of retaliation and thus less likely 
to work against rogue states who are more willing 
to take risks” (Perry, 300). Essentially, terrorism is 
an ideology not an entity like a state, so it 
undermines the fundamental principles of 
deterrence because it takes out the retaliation 
factor. Because of the reality regarding the 
difficulties involved with addressing nuclear 
terrorism, the United States continues to support 
the NPT because of the potential horrors 
proliferation into the wrong hands can cause. The 
hope is that any illicit and potentially nefarious 
nuclear activity can be prematurely executed. This 
theory of preemption and non-proliferation is 
perfectly portrayed in the recent U.S. – Iranian 
nuclear deal. In short, the United States goal 
throughout this is to prevent any ability or 
potential possibility of the Iranian government, or 
radical groups refuging in Iran, from constructing 
a bomb.  
However, where the policy of preemption will 
take us is uncertain. We are dealing with radical 
groups and nations that are commonly shielded by 
the sovereignty of the state in which they reside. 
Consequently, the United States will face assured 
limitations on the amount of preemptive tasks that 
can be accomplished. Take as an example the 
present threat of North Korea, where nuclear 
weapons have entered into the possession of a 
radical leader. Deterrence may work in this 
scenario, but that is only if we assume rationality 
amongst the leaders. That is, both the United 
States and especially North Korea refrain from 
nuclear attacks because they fear the same 
mutually assured destruction. Nevertheless, the 
United States essentially is barred from pursuing 
any act of preemption that violates North Koreas 
Sovereignty. Another factor that has come into 
play with the North Korean equation highlights a 
potential flaw facing the nonproliferation and 
preemption policies as a whole.  
Since North Koreas joining of the NPT in 
1985, they have successfully hid some of their 
nuclear activities from IAEA inspectors (Perry, 
303). North Korean scientists then learned how to 
separate the plutonium from the other elements of 
the hidden materials, which supposedly were for 
“peaceful purposes.” These events are perfect 
examples of Latent Proliferation, which is the 
covert spread of nuclear weapons. “North Korea’s 
development of nuclear technology, while 
ostensibly for peaceful purposes, gave it a latent 
capability to make plutonium for nuclear 
weapons” (Perry, 303). From this, the United 
States can further deduce that due to structural, or 
dare I say “organizational” weaknesses, our policy 
of preemption and nonproliferation may not 
totally suffice in the global struggle to address 
nuclear weapons in a way that makes the world 
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safer. However, where does all of this leave the 
United States?  
Based on the chronological historical evidence 
and the theoretical division presented in the 
literature, we can respond to the research question: 
Does American efforts of strengthening their 
nuclear capabilities and pursuing non-
proliferation truly lead to a safer country and 
world? Since the beginning of the nuclear era, 
America has implemented policies with parts of 
both Sagan and Waltz’s theories. American 
policies are aimed towards deterrence and non-
proliferation, but with the enduring necessity to 
remain the leading nuclear power. This effectively 
began right after America dropped the first bomb. 
As the dust was clearing, America knew it had to 
preserve this dominating force and looked to do so 
through their proposed Baruch Plan that called for 
the international control of nuclear activity. What 
America feared the most, became a reality when 
the Soviet Union successfully detonated their 
bomb. This tragedy of losing the American nuclear 
monopoly consumed the mindset of American 
leaders, which in turn motivated them to pursue 
new options of regaining that once held untouched 
and formidable power in the world.  
Instead of nipping the new nuclear 
technologies in the bud, America reacted with the 
decision to construct the ever more powerful 
hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Union was also 
looking to be regarded as the dominant power, so 
they followed in these pursuits, which resulted in 
the Arms Race. What was once a potentially 
manageable problem quickly evolved into frantic 
nuclear producing tensions. The American power 
seeking policies further continued, although 
sometimes in not so obvious ways. The non-
proliferation and deterrence efforts were obscured 
as treaties such as the Partial Test Ban, Tlateloco, 
NPT, SALT and START treaties.  Each of these 
treaties had different specific objectives but all had 
the same underlying primary goal. They all 
intended in some way to restrict the access of 
nuclear weapons to weak and powerful nuclear 
states alike. Through this, America would have the 
upper hand as intended. Even in the tougher 
America – Soviet Union treaties that seemed 
equal, America was still on top because their 
nuclear capability prevailed despite the diminished 
size the treaties called for.  
Despite all of America’s intentions that 
actually do give them the upper hand, the World is 
still in a nuclear tense position. This is because the 
adverse effects of America’s policies are in reality 
occurring.  Although the technology and 
administrations have changed, the consistent 
policies geared towards giving America the upper 
hand is only keeping tensions very much alive. To 
support this observation, we have to look at 
literature whose theories advocate for such. In 
Steven Weinberg’s opinion, the various dominant 
pursuing policies of America may easily be 
mistaken for offensive strategies. This means 
America’s neorealist policy of security through 
defense and deterrence advocated by Waltz, is 
actually keeping the tensions alive. This is because 
we are posing almost subliminal threats to the rest 
of the world through our policy of fear. This is 
much like the terrorist model presented by 
Wilson, who says these policies are much more 
likely to end in conflict because of the heightened 
defense that America forces on other countries, 
which they think they are successfully deterring. If 
there was to be a fight between a strong man and a 
weak man and the fight was determined by 
strength, the strong man would win. In an attempt 
to better his outcome, the strong man being who 
he is, will motivate the weak man to pack on 
serious muscle until the sides are even. This is 
exactly what is happening through Americas 
polices. Instead of negotiating, both sides are 
looking to get bigger and stronger which would 
ultimately make the fight bloodier and more 
violent.  
To strengthen this analysis, let us identify two 
significant paradoxes on the matter. The first is the 
fact that nuclear weapons are like any other 
weapon in the sense that they are meant to be 
used. However, they can never be used again 
because if they are the world will see definite 
irreversible destruction. The issue in resolving this 
discrepancy is that the countries of the world are 
simply not acting as if this is the case. The theory 
of deterrence is blinding leaders of this reality 
because of the goal to constantly match one 
another. The effect of this is more nuclear weapons 
that simply widen this paradox. In order to 
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mitigate and hopefully diminish such a 
discrepancy, the only realistic policy would be to 
reduce the amount of weapons to the point where 
this is no longer the case. The second paradox 
present is that governance is most needed in this 
area of international nuclear weapons agreements, 
but ultimately there is no basis for binding 
international rules. The treaties on nuclear 
weapons for the most part have been effective, but 
in reality these agreements are nothing more than 
mere suggestions. The fact of the matter is when it 
comes down to such an immense and rather 
uncharted reality of nuclear weapons, states will 
ultimately choose to act in a way that is aligned 
with survival in mind. The problem here is 
essentially figuring out which is the best way to 
survive, and the deeper problem is that countries 
are settling with scare tactics to keep themselves 
safe.  
 Although the world has seen seventy plus 
years of no nuclear catastrophes, arms races and 
tensions remained ever so high. Throughout this 
research, there has been conclusive evidence to 
suggest that America is in part the reason behind 
such nuclear hostilities that have been present. Just 
because there has not been nuclear attacks, does 
not mean American policies are keeping the 
country and the world safe. There needs to be 
much more concern in planning what is truly 
effective, after carefully considering how other 
countries will view and respond to such actions. 
The non-proliferation policies have grounds to 
them but America must remove the toxic 
deterrence model from the equation. If this is not 
implemented, irrational and rogue leaders will 
continue to look for ways to even the field and not 
find any reason to discontinue their attempts at 
gaining nuclear capabilities. Thus, our current 
situation could worsen and conceivably lead to 
world disaster. What has happened has happened 
and we cannot undo the past. However, we must 
realize that we are indeed living in a nuclear world 
and because of this; we cannot keep devising 
treaties and developing weapons with the aim at 
deterring other nations from using theirs. We 
must put it behind us and transition our efforts 
towards diplomacy if we ever want to see tensions 
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